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ATTORNEY'S FEES IN CIVIL RIGHTS
CASES: AN ESSAY ON
STREAMLINING THE
FORMULATION TO ATTRACT
GENERAL PRACTITIONERS
WILLIAM
I.

K. KIMBLE*

INTRODUCTION

This author's interest in writing an article about attorney's
fees in civil rights cases arises from the perception that after
more than twenty years of fee awards under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and after nine years of the awarding
of fees to "prevailing parties" under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976, the goal of Congress to attract lawyers
to represent plaintiffs in civil rights cases1 is largely unmet. A
Third Circuit Task Force, chaired by Judge H. Lee Sarokin of
the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, recently reported that: "Several members of the Task
Force expressed the view that fee awards in recent years in the
social action context have been so discouraging that few attorneys will accept a civil rights case."2
This article explores various theories for streamlining the
system in order to encourage attorneys to represent civil rights
plaintiffs. Two recent decisions serve as the starting point.
* B.A., Baylor University, 1967; J.D., Baylor University, 1969; Visiting Associate
Professor, University of Toledo College of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge the
assistance of Steven Zalewski and David Boekeloo.
1. The Senate Report stated the Congressional goal of the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Act of 1976:
It is intended that the amount of fees awarded under [42 U.S.C. § 1983] be
governed by the same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex
Federal litigation, such as antitrust cases and not be reduced because the rights
involved may be nonpecuniary in nature [citing cases in which these standards
have been appropriately applied]. . . .These cases have resulted in fees which
are adequate to attract competent counsel, but which do not produce windfalls
to attorneys.
S.REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5908, 5913; accord H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976).
2. Third Circuit Task Force, CourtAwarded Attorney Fees, Supplement to 771 F.2d
at 19 (3d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Task Force Report].
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The3 Fifth Circuit's decision in Uviedo v. Steves Sash & Door
Co. is significant on the issue of determining whether a plaintiff has achieved sufficient success to be a "prevailing party."
Part II of this article discusses the two standards for determining whether a party is "prevailing" for purposes of a fee
award. These standards are the central-issue test and the anysignificant-issue test. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Nephew
v. City of Aurora4 is significant on the issue of the amount of
fees to which an admittedly prevailing party is entitled. Each
decision demonstrates a need for an explication of the United
States Supreme Court's seminal opinion on section 1983 prevailing parties in Hensley v. Eckerhart.5 In that case the
Supreme Court made this statement about determining the
prevailing party issue:
A plaintiff must be a "prevailing party" to recover an
attorney's fee under § 1988. The standard for making this
threshold determination has been framed in various ways. A
typical formulation is that "plaintiffs may be considered
'prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves
some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." This
is a generous formulation that brings the plaintiff only across
the statutory threshold. It remains for the district court to
determine what fee is "reasonable." 6
The Supreme Court in Hensley also dealt with the extent
of a plaintiff's success and the relationship it has to the
amount of fees to be awarded. But the case did not involve
an award of nominal damages. The Court was therefore not
called upon to decide whether a district court must reduce the
amount of the attorney's fee award if the prevailing party has
recovered only nominal damages. That question is addressed
in Nephew v. City of Aurora.8 Thus, Part III considers the
viability of a claim for attorney's fees when only small or minimal damages are awarded to a "prevailing" party.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

760 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1985).
766 F.2d 1464 (10th Cir. 1985).
461 U.S. 424 (1983).
Id. at 433 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (9th Cir. 1978)).
Id. at 434.
766 F.2d 1464.
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Once the threshold to entitlement issues are discussed, the
article continues to review limits on amounts of attorney fee
awards. Part IV reviews the recent move to simplify the analysis. Part V considers the issue of whether a prevailing attorney employed on a contingency basis is entitled to an upward
adjustment of fees. The article concludes by setting forth suggested means by which the fee award system could be altered
in order to further the objectives of the Civil Rights Act.
II.

"PREVAILING" ON ANY-SIGNIFICANT-ISSUE OR
CENTRAL-ISSUE

The judges for the Fifth Circuit recently voted eight to six
to deny a rehearing en banc in Uviedo v. Steves Sash & Door
Co. 9 The Fifth Circuit thereby reaffirmed its minority position that in order to meet the "prevailing party" requirement
plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have been successful on
"the central issue" in the lawsuit. Lamenting the hardship
imposed by this decision, Judge Rubin said in his dissent to
Uviedo that:
Hensley directs that "[a] request for attorney's fees
should not result in a second major litigation." The application of the central-issue test guarantees increasingly protracted and complicated litigation over fees applications in
an effort to distinguish centrality from significance. This
case was filed eight years ago, yet litigation over attorney's
fees continues long after the substantive issues have been decided. The Nadeau test fulfills the purpose of Congress, facilitates judicial administration, and reduces litigation
expense. It is time for us to adopt it and to make the threshold an entry rather than a barrier. 10
In contrast to the majority's central issue test, the Nadeau
test mentioned by Judge Rubin is as follows: "[P]laintiffs may
be considered 'prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes
if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which
achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing
suit."'" Judge Rubin's dissenting opinion lists the Sixth Cir9. 760 F.2d at 89.
10. Uviedo, 760 F.2d at 89 (footnote ommitted) (emphasis added) (reference is to
Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (lst Cir. 1978)).
11. Uviedo, 760 F.2d at 88 (quoting Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 278-79) (emphasis added).
The other circuits applying the Nadeau standard are Abraham v. Pekarski, 728 F.2d
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cuit as following the Nadeau standard. 12 However, the Sixth
Circuit decision cited by Judge Rubin, Kentucky Association
for Retarded Citizens v. Conn,13 actually applies the central
issue test."4

On the other hand, it is the position of the Second Circuit"5 and the Ninth Circuit16 that the Supreme Court in
Hensley approved the Nadeau standard for determining
whether a party is a "prevailing party." In Lummi Indian
Tribe v. Oltman,I7 the Ninth Circuit reversed a decision denying prevailing party status. The district court had denied fees
because both parties received benefits and made concessions in
the settlement. The court of appeals found that analysis to be
"inconsistent with Hensley v. Eckerhart"'18 and further said
that Hensley had approved the more "generous standard"' 9 of
Nadeau.
Although the Supreme Court ultimately denied certiorari,
it was this conflict among the circuits over the correct definition of "prevailing party" that warranted the filing of a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court by the
plaintiff in Uviedo. 20 The facts in Uviedo point up the difference between the central-issue test and the any-significant-issue test. Plaintiff Uviedo, a Hispanic worker, sued under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act 2 l on the basis of national origin
167, 175 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3513 (1984); Kansas Congressional Dist.
Reapportionment Cases, 745 F.2d 610, 612 (10th Cir. 1984); Austin v. Dep't of Com-

merce, 742 F.2d 1417, 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Gingras v. Lloyd, 740 F.2d 210, 212 (2d
Cir. 1984); Fast v. School Dist., 728 F.2d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Lummi
Indian Tribe v. Oltman, 720 F.2d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir. 1983); Lotz Realty Co. v. HUD,
717 F.2d 929, 931 (4th Cir. 1983); Miller v. Staats, 706 F.2d 336, 340-41 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
12. Uviedo, 760 F.2d at 88.
13. 718 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1983).
14. The Third Circuit has cited Kentucky Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Conn, 718
F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1983), as being a "Post-Hensley" case setting a standard that requires
a prevailing party to "prevail" on "the central issue." Institutionalized Juveniles v.
Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 911 (3d. Cir. 1985).
15. Gingras v. Lloyd, 740 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1984).
16. Lummi Indian Tribe v. Oltman, 720 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1983).
17. Id.
18. Id.at 1125.
19. 760 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1985).
20. Uviedo, 760 F.2d 87, cert. denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3460 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1986) (No.
85-405).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
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discrimination. She pleaded and tried four disparate wage
claims, two denial of promotion claims, and one constructive
discharge claim. Uviedo prevailed on two of the claims; she
was awarded ninety-eight dollars in back-pay on one disparate
wage claim and another $288 in back pay on denial of one of
the promotion claims. She failed on her constructive discharge claim which the court of appeals characterized as the
central issue in her suit. Writing for the panel, Judge Garwood said:
[O]f the approximate $48,000 in damages sought, she has
received only $386 plus interest ....
Certainly she has
shown that there was merit to some of her contentions. But
she has not shown merit in most of them, or in the most importantof them, or in any that could fairly be describedsingly
or collectively, as the central issue in the case.22
Without question, Uviedo would have been a prevailing party
under the any-significant-issue test. As Judge Williams said in
his concurring opinion, Uviedo vindicated her rights under
Title VII and should have been held to be a prevailing party.23
In urging that the Fifth Circuit reconsider en banc its centralissue rule, Judge Williams discussed the Uviedo result as being
a restrictive application of pleading rules:
In effect we are abandoning our general rule of liberality in
pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f). . . . We are saying that the
plaintiff must lose because she undertook to prove too much.
If she had based her suit solely upon the instances of discrimination she successfully proved, she would recover attorney's fees without question.24
A major frailty of the central-issue test is that it encourages civil rights defendants to engage in claim counting in order to contend that plaintiff is not a prevailing party. For
example, in a great many lawsuits against cities and counties
the plaintiff will have prevailed against only the governmental
entity.25 In a typical suit involving allegations of police misconduct, a cautious plaintiff's lawyer may, for statute of limi22. Uviedo v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 738 F.2d 1425, 1433 (5th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).

23. Id. at 1433 (Williams, J., concurring).
24. Id.
25. This situation is a natural outgrowth of the Supreme Court's holding in Owen
v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, reh 'g denied, 446 U.S. 993 (1980). The Court in
that case held that a city may be held liable under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act,
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tations and other purposes, feel obligated to join several
different categories of defendants: the city, the individual police officers who committed the acts in question, their supervisors, the chief of police, the city manager, and members of the
city council. Then, if it becomes simply a matter of counting
claims and defendants, a plaintiff may have prevailed on just
one claim against just one defendant. In "central issue" jurisdictions, defendants can make the contention that the plaintiff
has won only one of twelve claims and therefore should not be
considered a prevailing party. If the claim upon which a
plaintiff has prevailed results in a large damage award, the
plaintiff will rhost likely be held to be a prevailing party, even
under the central issue test. If the successful claims resulted
in only a small damage award, however, under Uviedo and the
central issue test, the plaintiff would not be a prevailing party
for attorney's fees purposes.
These points are well illustrated in Mary Beth G. v. City of
Chicago26 which involved a successful attack on the City of
Chicago's strip search policy. The district court disallowed
attorney's fees for the time spent in litigating the strip search
claim against the individual defendants. The Seventh Circuit
reversed, rejecting the approach of counting claims and defendants, stating:
It would therefore be illogical to define compensable "claims
for relief" in terms of defendants, because once the plaintiff's claim succeeds against one defendant, the plaintiff will
have achieved full relief for the illegal course of conduct
notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to obtain relief from
each and every defendant. A recovery against more than
one of the defendants will not enhance the amount of the
damage award. We hold that when, as here, a plaintiff raises
a claim for relief that relates to several defendants, not all of
whom are held liable, the total time expended on the claim
for relief should be counted in awarding the plaintiff attorney's fees so long as the defendants from whom plaintiff did
not obtain relief were not named frivolously.27

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), even though the individual city officials are entitled to qualify
for immunity.
26. 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).

27. Id. at 1281.
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III.

BEYOND CENTRAL-ISSUE VS. SIGNIFICANCE:
GUARANTEEING FULLY COMPENSATORY FEES
PURSUANT TO AN AWARD OF SMALL OR
NOMINAL DAMAGES

Aside from encouraging claim and defendant counting,
another major weakness of the central-issue test is that it assigns very little importance to recovery of small damages in
civil rights cases. A plaintiff who recovers only small or nominal damages will seldom be considered a prevailing party
under the central-issue test. This result prevents any widespread interest among lawyers in handling civil rights cases,
especially those which are on behalf of individual plaintiffs.
Civil rights actions which are appropriate for class treatment
will not suffer for lack of competent lawyers. But if sole practitioners and general practitioners 'cannot be assured of attorney's fee awards when they recover small or nominal
damages, then people with meritorious individual claims will
have difficulty finding representation.
Although there is ambivalence among the appellate courts
and the district courts as to whether lawyers who win small
damage awards should be fully compensated, there are some
decisions in which the courts have taken a strong position in
favor of fully compensatory fees. In Milwe v. Cavuoto,28 a police misconduct suit, the plaintiff recovered $1,320 on a pendent state law claim and one dollar on a constitutional claim.
The Second Circuit held that even if fees were not awarded on
the basis of the state law claim, the one dollar recovery on the
constitutional claim would be sufficient to support an award
of attorney's fees. 29 The court indicated that its holding was
in furtherance of congressional intent:
The award of counsel fees is not intended to punish the defendant in any way. Rather it is to permit and encourage
plaintiffs to enforce their civil rights. To declare those rights
while simultaneously denying the award of fees would seriously undermine the declared congressional policy. Fees
may not be denied simply because only nominal damages are
awarded.3 °
28. 653 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1981).

29. Id. at 84.
30. Id. (quoting Perez v. University of Puerto Rico, 600 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1979)).
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The court in Milwe also made two important points about individual damage actions involving police misconduct: these
lawsuits are sometimes "the only tool reasonably available to
vindicate society's interest" 31 in curbing police abuses, and
32
such lawsuits will commonly result in small damage awards.
In a teacher lay-off case with due process claims the
Eighth Circuit held in Fast v. School District of Ladue 33 that
the plaintiff who received one dollar in nominal damages was
entitled to attorney's fees. In this decision the court held that
the amount of relief obtained was insignificant under the Nadeau test 34 and that it believed that the Nadeau test had been
in Hensley v. Eckerhart35

approved by the Supreme Court
The court in Fast relied on an earlier decision, Dean v.
Civiletti,36 a Title VII sex discrimination case. The district
court in Dean had found for the plaintiff on one count of discrimination but had denied reinstatement. There was also no
evidence that the plaintiff had sustained any monetary loss;
thus there was no back pay award. The court of appeals,
while affirming the lower court's decision on the merits, ordered that nominal damages of one dollar be awarded and
held that an award of attorney's fees should be made. The
court said that plaintiff had "prevailed on [a] discrimination
issue" 37 and was therefore entitled to attorney's fees.
Some federal courts, however, discount the amount of fees
awarded in cases in which only small damages have been recovered. An illustration is the recent decision of the Tenth
Circuit in Nephew v. City of Aurora.38 The Nephew suit by
four plaintiffs was composed of claims of assault, battery and
false arrest by City of Aurora police officers acting pursuant to
a custom or policy of the city to discriminate against blacks.
In addition to damages, injunctive and declaratory relief were
31. 653 F.2d at 84.
32. Id. See also 626 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1980).
33. 728 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1984) (en bane).
34. Id. at 1032.
35. Id. at 1032 n.2 ("The Supreme Court's description of a legal rule as 'a typical
formulation.' Without any intimation whatsoever that it might not agree with that formulation is a firm basis for a fair inference that the Court in fact approves the standard

given.").
36. 670 F.2d 99 (8th Cir. 1982).
37. Id. at 101.
38. 766 F.2d 1464 (10th Cir. 1985).
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sought against the city, its mayor and its city council. Damages were sought against the individual police officers. The
district court granted a motion for directed verdict in favor of
the city, the mayor and the city council. The case proceeded
to a jury verdict only upon the claims for actual and punitive
damages of $2,000,000 against the individual police officers.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of two of the plaintiffs,
but awarded them only one dollar each as compensatory damages. No punitive damages were awarded. Subsequently, the
trial court awarded attorney's fees of $12,500, expressly refusing to reduce the award on the ground urged by defendants
that the prevailing plaintiffs had won only nominal damages.39
The Tenth Circuit reversed, stating the controlling issue as
follows: "The issue therefore becomes whether, in a § 1983
case in which plaintiffs proceed only to litigate monetary damages, the attorney's fees awarded should be reduced if the
plaintiffs in fact are awarded only nominal damages of
$2.00." 40 The panel, in a split decision, then held that the district court abused its discretion by not discounting the fee
award because the plaintiffs were awarded only nominal damages. The court indicated that it was relying on the language
in Hensley that one important factor in determining the reasonableness of fee award is the "results obtained. '41 The
panel then criticized a recent decision by the Tenth Circuit in
Ramos v. Lamm 4 2 as not being a "proper vehicle for this court
to expound on the significance of a nominal monetary recovery in a section 1983 suit in which substantial damages are
sought. '4 3 The panel in Ramos, in dicta, had rejected the
practice of reducing fee awards because the monetary recovery was small.44
The Nephew decision is a misapplication of Hensley v. Eckerhart.45 The issue in Hensley was whether a plaintiff, who
raised several unrelated claims and who had prevailed on only
some of those unrelated claims, could recover fees for work
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 1465.
Id.
Id. at 1466 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435).
713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1983).
Nephew, 766 F.2d at 1465.
Ramos, 713 F.2d at 557.
461 U.S. 424 (1983).
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done on the unsuccessful claims. The emphasis in Hensley is
that a plaintiff who has prevailed on one or more claims
should not be awarded fees for work on distinct claims which
were unsuccessful. Indeed, as the dissent in Nephew points
out, the district court had applied Hensley "by reducing the
award to reflect the fact that some of the time was spent pursuing claims for the two plaintiffs who did not prevail.

' 46

The

dissent found the dicta of Ramos v. Lamm to be persuasive,
noting that Ramos is a post-Hensley decision made in "full
awareness of the Supreme Court's reference to 'results obtained.' ,47 Writing for the dissent, Judge McKay also stated
that Congress has expressed the intention that fees should not
be reduced because the rights involved may be nonpecuniary
in nature.48 A plaintiff who has vindicated contitutional
rights or other civil rights by determining that a violation has
occurred should receive attorney's fees on a fully compensatory basis; the amount of money damages should not be a
factor.
In addition to the "results obtained" language of Hensley,
the majority in Nephew cited with approval the opinions in
Burt v. Abel 49 and Perez v. University of Puerto Rico 5° in
which the Fourth and First Circuits, respectively, held that
even though a judgment of small damages does not permit a
court to deny an award of attorney's fees, it is a factor which
may be considered in determining the amount of the award.
Decisions such as Burt and Perez, viewed from a functional
standpoint, deal a serious blow to the congressional goal of
attracting lawyers to civil rights cases. As recognized by the
Nephew dissent:
What both these cases [Burt and Perez] and the majority
opinion fail to recognize, however, is that the policy of encouraging private citizens to enforce their constitutional
rights and the importance to society that constitutional
rights be vindicated - the factors which lead them to view
the parties as prevailing parties despite the award of nominal
damages - lead to the further conclusion that attorney's
46. 766 F.2d at 1468 (McKay, J., dissenting).

47. Id.
48. Id. at 1469.
49. 585 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1978).
50. 600 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979).
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fees should not be reduced because only nominal damages
were awarded. 1
The serious uncertainties visited upon plaintiffs' civil
rights lawyers by decisions such as Burt, Perez and Nephew
are demonstrated by two federal district court decisions made
in Texas in 1982. The cases have several similarities, but the
courts reached very different results. In Johnston v. Shaw,52
four plaintiffs were awarded nominal damages of one dollar
each in a case in which the court found due process violations.
Plaintiffs requested a fee award of $8,812.50, being the product of 117.5 hours at a rate of seventy-five dollars per hour.
Although finding a rate of seventy-five dollars per hour to be
reasonable, the district court, in an unpublished opinion, 53 reduced the fee award to $1500. 54 It is clear that the fact that
only nominal damages were recovered was a major factor in
the large reduction by the court. The court stated: "Because
only nominal damages were recovered and the principal remedy obtained consisted of a minor change in agency notice-ofaward of attorney's
right-to-appeal procedures, an exorbitant
'55
fees is not called for in this case."
The court's opinion on this attorney's fee application is
unpublished. This fact beckons further analysis, especially
since the court's opinion on the merits was a detailed eightpage published opinion.5 6 Discussion of unpublished opinions
in law review articles is not commonplace. As Professors
Reynolds and Richman stated in their article about unpublished opinions in the circuit courts of appeals:
The Supreme Court, of course, can review only a tiny
fraction of the cases decided by the courts of appeals. With
review from above so unlikely, the real accountability of the
courts of appeals is to the bench, the bar, the scholars, and
the public. Unpublished opinions.

. .

will generally not re-

ceive critical commentary from those groups for the obvious
reason that they will go unnoticed. A less obvious consider51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

766 F.2d at 1469 (McKay, J., dissenting).
556 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
Johnston v. Shaw, No. CA 5-80-133, slip op. (N.D. Tex. May 6, 1983).
Id. at 11.
Id. at 5.
Johnston v. Shaw, 556 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
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ation is that there is relatively little
57 incentive to comment
upon an opinion that is not "law.",
The unpublished opinion reveals a lawsuit on issues of first
impression regarding a state statute substantial contentions of
eleventh amendment immunity, and abstention. Also, a serious question as to the existence of a "property interest" was
implicated. The tenor of the court's unpublished opinion on
the fee application is that the issues involved in the lawsuit
were simple, as indicated by the court's reference to "the relative lack of complexity involved in the issues which were actually litigated at trial .

.

. 8 In addition to reliance on the

nominal damages factor some courts have cited the simplicity
of due process issues as a rationale for reducing fees. 59 It
seems a fair statement that many lawyers who have litigated
due process claims as plaintiff or defendant in federal court
would disagree. For example, predicting the probable outcome of a given due process claim has been far from easy, as
the Fuentes60 - W. T Mitchell 6 1 - Di-Chem62 trilogy of prejudgment seizure cases illustrates.63
The court in Johnston also emphasized that little actual
court time, less than two hours, was involved in the case on
the merits." The court's perspective on this point gives no
attention to the reality that a great percentage of claims now
litigated in federal court are appropriate for summary judgment treatment and are prepared with that end in mind. Indeed, one of the ironies of federal civil trial practice is that
very little "trial" is involved. A prominent example of this
trend is shown by the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Blum v. Stenson 65 in which the Court approved 809 hours
57. Reynolds & Richman, The Non-PrecedentialPrecedent - Limited Publication
and No-Citation Rules in the United States Court of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167,

1203 (1978).
58. Johnston v. Shaw, No. CA 5-80-133, slip op. at 11.
59. Peeler v. Longview Indep. School Dist., 485 F. Supp. 117, 122 (E.D. Tex.

1979).
60. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
61. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).

62. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
63. Kay & Lubin, Making Sense ofthe PrejudgmentSeizure Cases, 64 Ky. L.J. 705,
705 (1976).
64. Johnston v. Shaw, No. CA 5-80-133, slip op. at 3, 6.
65. 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984).
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as being reasonably expended in a case which was decided on
cross-motions for summary judgment after only one set of
plaintiff's interrogatories had been served and answered.66
Finally, the unpublished opinion in Johnston indicates the
court's bottom line. As "additional factors" 67 the court in
Johnston considered the fact that counsel for plaintiffs had
stated in open court that he felt attorney's fees would not be
appropriate in this case 68 and that the tones of the supporting
affidavits by plaintiff's lawyer and another civil rights plaintiff's lawyer were strident. 69 The court's question to plaintiff's
lawyer inquiring whether fees would be sought was put to him
prior to entry of judgment on the merits. 70 It is highly ques-

tionable whether such an inquiry at that stage of the proceedings is proper. It would appear to have the effect of
discouraging prevailing plaintiffs from seeking attorney's fees,
and, while this author might agree with the court about the
strident tone of the affidavits, this matter of etiquette should
not enter the court's decision-making.7 1
66. Id. at 1544.
67. Johnston v. Shaw, No. CA 5-80-133, slip op. at 9.
68. Id. at 10.
69. Id.
70. In response to a direct question in open court, counsel for plaintiffs informed the court that, in his opinion, an award of attorneys' fees would not be
appropriate in this case. He felt, at that time, that any such award would simply
reduce the funds available to the LCGAA for assisting the poor and needy of
Lubbock County. Despite this presentation, counsel for plaintiffs now seeks to
receive attorneys' fees. The court feels compelled to point out that a substantial
award of attorneys' fees would have exactly the effect Mr. McIntyre feared at the
time of trial. It would deprive the LCGAA of funds which would otherwise be
available to assist families with paying their heating bills in winter and making
their monthly rent payments.
Johnston v. Shaw, No. CA 5-80-133, slip op. at 10. The hearing to which the court
alludes was the hearing on the merits and was held on December 7, 1982. Judgment
was entered on December 9, 1982. Johnston v. Shaw, 556 F. Supp. 406, 408, 414 (N.D.
Tex. 1982).
71. Perhaps the court's ultimate motivation for not publishing its opinion on attorney's fees is consistent with the following statement by Professors Reynolds and
Richman:
Publication, however, cannot be limited without incurring substantial costs.
An unpublished opinion is virtually invisible to public scrutiny; hence, the decision not to publish make judges less accountable for their decision-making. Decreased accountability in turn leads to both the perception and the possibility of
inconsistent, arbitrary, and even biased decisions.
Richman & Reynolds, The Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions: A Critique, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 314 (1985).
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In a case similar to Johnston, Nicholson v. Bates, 72 the district court permitted an award of fees of $9,150 for 116.5
hours of work on the case. The case involved less complicated
legal issues than Johnston in that the plaintiff's claims were
for racial discrimination in housing against a private landlord.
Unlike Johnston, however, the case was tried to a jury. The
jury made a favorable finding on liability but awarded no
damages to the plaintiff.7 3 Pursuant to the Supreme Court's
decision in Carey v. Piphus,7 4 the court awarded one dollar in
nominal damages.
The court in Nicholson takes an approach totally different
from the one taken by the judge in Johnston; the tenor of the
Nicholson court's published opinion is written in terms of vindication of civil rights. It describes the right to obtain housing
in a manner which is free from racial discrimination as "a basic right that is ultimately non-pecuniary."7 5 Specifically on
the question of small damages the court said:
Under § 1983, attorney's fees should ordinarily be
awarded, unless some special circumstance present in the action would render such an award unjust. . . . The finding
of liability by the jury, and a subsequent refusal to award
substantial damages, does not constitute such a special circumstance. In fact, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated
that "the potential liability of § 1983 defendants for attorney's fees . . . provides additional - and by no means inconsequential assurance that [defendants] will 76not
deliberately ignore" the rights protected by that statute.
Considering the range of decisions on the question of the
award of attorney's fees based on nominal or small damages,
there is a strong possibility that the issue will be decided by
the Supreme Court. On August 28, 1985, Justice Rehnquist,
sitting for the Ninth Circuit, issued a stay of the Ninth Circuit's mandate in City of Riverside v. Rivera.77 The City of
Riverside and five of its police officers were thereby temporar72. 544 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Tex. 1982).
73. Id. at 256.

74. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
75. Nicholson, 544 F. Supp. at 260.
76. Id. at 258 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.11 (1978)). The court,

in addition, relied on another similar housing decision. See Johnson v. Snyder, 470 F.
Supp. 972 (N.D. Ohio 1979), affid, 639 F.2d 316 (6th Cir. 1981).

77. 54 U.S.L.W. 3143 (U.S. Aug. 28, 1985).
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ily relieved of the obligation to pay $245,456 in attorney's fees
to plaintiffs who had recovered a total of $33,350 in damages.
Justice Rehnquist framed the issued in this way: "This
case seems to me to present a significant question involving
the construction of § 1988: should a court, in determining the
amount of "a reasonable attorney's fee" under the statute,
consider the amount of monetary damages recovered in the
underlying action?" 78 Justice Rehnquist noted that neither
the Hensley nor Blum cases addressed whether "disproportionality"7 9 between the amount of monetary judgment and
the amount of the proposed attorney's fee should be a factor
in the determination of the fee award. Justice Rehnquist postured that the issue presented in Rivera would draw at least
the minimum-required four votes for the granting of certiorari
in the instant case or in a similar case. He also found that
petitioners would have a substantial probability of success on
the merits.8 0 This necessarily tentative judgment by Justice
Rehnquist is mainly based on his assessment that "a very reasonable client might seriously question an attorney's bill of
$245,000 for services which had resulted solely in a monetary
award of less than $34,000. ' 81 However, Justice Rehnquist
made what might seem to be a concession by saying that he is
not suggesting that substantial attorney's fees cannot be
awarded in cases involving "primarily injunctive or other nonpecuniary relief."8 2
Justice Rehnquist's tentative opinion in Rivera tends to ignore the public interest genesis of the Attorney's Fees Act of
1976, and it is contrary to the Supreme Court's position expressed by Justice Powell in Blum:
Nor do we believe that the number of persons benefited is
a consideration of significance in calculating fees under
§ 1988. Unlike the calculation of attorney's fees under the
"common fund doctrine," where a reasonable fee is based on
a percentage of the fund bestowed on the class, a reasonable
fee under § 1983 reflects the amount of attorney time reasonably expended on the litigation. Presumably, counsel will
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id. at 3144.
Id. at 3144-45.
Id.

82. Id.
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spend as much time and will be as diligent in litigating a case
that benefits a small class of people or, indeed, in protecting
the civil rights of a single individual.83
If the Supreme Court chooses to address the nominal and
small damages issue, the resolution should be aided by the recommendations of the Third Circuit Task Force. The Task
Force indicated a "need for a neutral fee-setting process that
does not relate fees in statutory cases [civil rights, antitrust,
and federal securities, for example] to subjective judgments
about 'benefit' and does not become mired in a concern about
84
the dollars recovered and the dollars to be awarded in fees."
The Task Force expressed the hope that such an approach will
allow civil rights lawyers adequate compensaton to vindicate
public policies "without regard to whether they produce economic or noneconomic benefits." 85
IV.

BLUM V. STENSON: SIMPLIFYING THE ANALYSIS

Once entitlement to a fee award is established, the amount
of the award is the issue to be focused upon. A United States
Supreme Court clarification of the issue would certainly simplify the analysis. Until recently, the federal courts in setting
attorney's fee awards followed the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.8 6 In Johnson, the
court held that a district court should consider twelve factors 7 in order to determine whether any adjustment should be
made to make the fee reasonably compensatory. But this feature of attorney's fees analysis has been changed by the
Supreme Court's decision in Blum v. Stenson.88 As a Texas
83. 104 S. Ct. at 1549-50 n.16 (1984).
84. Task Force Report, supra note 2, at 39.
85. Id.
86. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
87. The twelve factors are: 1) The time and labor required; 2) The novelty
and difficulty of the questions; 3) The skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly; 4) The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; 5) The customary fee; 6) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
7) Time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; 8) The amount
involved and the results obtained; 9) The experience, reputation, and ability of
the attorneys; 10) The "undesirability" of the case; 11) The nature and length of
the professional relationship with the client; and 12) Awards in similar cases.
Id. at 716-20.
88. 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984).
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district court stated in Patrick v. Trustees of Mineola Independent School District:
Before Blum, a court was required to direct light from the
lodestar through the twelve filters enumerated in Johnson, in
order to determine whether an overall adjustment of the
product of hours-times-rate was necessary to make fees reasonably compensatory. In Blum, the court. held that the prevailing hourly rate in the community already subsumes most
of the factors listed in Johnson . . . The only Johnson factor to survive Blum is contingency .... 89
The Tenth Circuit reached the same conclusion in Jordan
v. Heckler,9° a case decided under the Equal Access to Justice
Act. The Ninth Circuit ruled to the same effect in Hall v.
Bolger.91 The elimination of the necessity of considering the
Johnson factors should result in attorney's fee awards being
much more susceptible of prediction. Also, the amount of
time spent by federal judges and their staffs on fee decisions
and opinion writing should be greatly reduced.
In addition to the great amount of judicial time required to
consider all the Johnson factors, some of the factors, such as
"the novelty and difficulty of the questions," the "skill requisite to perform the legal service properly," and "the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys" involved the
federal courts in highly subjective determinations.
In some cases the determination of the novelty and difficulty of the case appears to be little more than a bare conclusion, with no supporting rationale. While it is true that the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of
1976 considers civil rights cases inherently complex, 92 findings
by some courts that cases involving due process rights, abstention, and sovereign immunity allegations 93 are "simple," are
not unusual. 94 The Supreme Court in Blum resolved this con89. 603 F. Supp. 754, 759 (E.D. Tex. 1984).
90. 744 F.2d 1397 (10th Cir. 1984).
91. 768 F.2d 1148, 1150 (9th Cir. 1985).
92. "It is intended that the amount of fees awarded under [§ 1983] be governed by
the same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex Federal litigation,
such as antitrust cases .
5..."
S. REP., supra note 1, at 5913 (emphasis added).
93. See King v. New Hampshire Dep't of Resources and Economic Dev., 562 F.2d
80 (1st Cir. 1977).
94. See Johnston v. Shaw, No. CA 5-80-133, slip op. at 7 (N.D. Tex. May 6, 1983);
Peeler v. Longview Indep. School Dist., 485 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Tex. 1979).
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flict of opinion in the following fashion: "The novelty and
complexity of the issues presumably were fully reflected in the
number of billable hours recorded by counsel and thus do not
warrant an upward adjustment in a fee based on the number
of billable hours times reasonable hourly rates." 95
The Johnson factor, on the other hand, which involves inquiry into "reputation" of counsel, remains a highly subjective
exercise. Among other problems it requires lawyers applying
for a fee to "toot their own horns." This sort of self-adulation
is in general discouraged by the canons of ethics of the American Bar Association. 96 Of course, since the fee applicants
must toot their own horns, this makes their reputation fair
game for the party opposing the fee. At the very least, this
needless attention to reputation might tend to diminish good
relations among the federal bench and bar. Moreover, if the
fee applicant is found to have represented a prevailing party,
that fact should speak for itself about the lawyer's ability. For
the most part the Supreme Court in Blum eliminated the necessity of inquiring into reputation by holding that "'quality
of representation' .

generally is reflected in the reasonable

'97
hourly rate."
Related to the reputation problem is the practice in some
recent decisions of diminishing the hourly rate because the attorney is a sole practitioner. In Clark v. Marsh,98 a district
court reduced the hourly rate from $100 per hour to eightyfive dollars per hour on the basis that plaintiff's attorney is a
sole practitioner. The court assumed that since the attorney
did not have a full complement of support staff she must have
spent some time on tasks which were not "lawyer tasks." The
holding in Clark is particularly harmful in a field of law in
which many of the plaintiffs' lawyers are sole practitioners or
they are in small partnerships or corporations which do not
employ paralegals and other sophisticated support staff.

95. 104 S. Ct. at 1548.
96. "A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, associate or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use or participate in the use of any form of public
communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self laudatory or
unfair statement or claim." (emphasis added). MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (1982).

97. 104 S. Ct. at 1549.
98. 609 F. Supp. 1028 (D.D.C. 1985).
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The fine-tuning effected by Blum with respect to the reputation issue could be augmented by standardizing hourly
rates. The Third Circuit Task Force recommends this procedure, concluding that development of standardized districtwide hourly rates could achieve "substantial efficiencies and
objectification." 99 The Task Force recommends in general
terms that the hourly rates be structured according to the
number of years of experience of the lawyers and indicates
that a specific schedule, such as that adopted by Community
Legal Services of Philadelphia, may be appropriate. 0
V.

CONTINGENCY ENHANCEMENT

A question left open by the United States Supreme Court
in Blum v. Stenson was whether the fact that a prevailing
plaintiff's case was handled by an attorney on a contingency
basis should result in an upward adjustment of fees: "We
have no occasion in this case to consider whether the risk of
not being the prevailing party in a § 1983 case, and therefore
not being entitled to an award of attorney's fees from one's
adversary, may ever justify an upward fee adjustment." 10 1 A
more precise analysis is that delay in receiving the fee is a factor at least as important as the risk of losing. The court in
Patrickv. Trustees of Mineola Independent School District,102 a
post-Blum decision, touched on the question: "The only
Johnson factor to survive Blum is contingency, that is, the de99. Task Force Report, supra note 2, at 32.
100. The Community Legal Services rate schedule is:
Category
Law Students
Attorneys with post law school experience under two
years
Attorneys with 2-5 years experience
Attorneys with 6-10 years experience
Attorneys with more than 10 years experience
Supervising Attorneys, Projects Heads, Managing
Attorneys, Deputy Director, Executive Director
Paralegals I and II
Senior and Supervisory Paralegals
Id. at 33 n.68.
101. 104 S. Ct. at 1550 n.17.
102. 603 F. Supp. 754 (E.D. Tex. 1984).

Range of Hourly
Rates
$30.00 - $50.00
$60.00 - $85.00
$80.00 - $120.00
$100.00 - $160.00

$125.00- $180.00
$130.00- $200.00
$30.00 - $40.00
$40.00 - $60.00
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gree of risk that the action will be unsuccessful, and also that

0 3
payment will be delayed."'1

Since Blum seven appellate courts have considered the
question of whether a contingent fee arrangement may justify
an upward adjustment to the fee lodestar. Five circuits have
held that an increase is permissible."° The decision by the
First Circuit in Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp.10 5 is the most
recent. In Wildman the district court allowed a fifty percent
upward adjustment to the lodestar but gave an essentially
rambling rationale:
[I]n this particular action the attorneys for the plaintiff faced
and overcame difficulties above and beyond the normal prosecution of an action. The law in this area is still in its formative stages. Counsel displayed an acute understanding of the
law. The plaintiff's attorneys also faced a contingency of
losing all their time and effort. The ability of defendants'
counsel and the competency with which they represented
their clients, required even more than the average performance on the part of plaintiff's attorneys. °6
The First Circuit rejected the district court's reliance on
compexity or novelty of the issues stating that, as a result of
Blum, upward adjustments for quality of representation "are
to be few and far between." 0 7 The court of appeals, instead,
framed the issue as "whether a multiplier can be justified
solely because of the contingent nature of the action."' 8 In
holding that a multiplier can be justified on such a basis, the
court reasoned that, while the lodestar may reflect the difficulty and novelty of a case, it does not differentiate between a
case taken on a full retainer and a case in which a lawyer
spends many hours over a period of years with no assurance of
ever receiving a fee.' 0 9 The First Circuit indicated that per103. Id. at 759 (emphasis added).

104. Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1985); LaDuke v.
Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985); Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air
v. Pennsylvania, 762 F.2d 272, 282 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 57 (1985); Sierra
Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 620 (8th Cir. 1985); Jones v. Central Soya Co., 748 F.2d
586, 591 (11th Cir. 1984); Hall v. Borough of Roselle, 747 F.2d 838, 842-43 (3d Cir.
1984).
105. 771 F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1985).
106. Id. at 610.
107. Id. (quoting Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F.2d 727, 739 (1st Cir. 1984)).
108. 771 F.2d at 611.
109. Id. at 612.
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mitting a district court to consider an upward adjustment in a
contingent fee case is necessary to effectuate the will of
Congress:
Section 1988 was enacted in order to enable plaintiffs to
secure civil rights guaranteed to them under federal law and
the Constitution. We think it clear that Congress did not
intend that the enforcement of civil rights be limited primarily to those able to pay an attorney a full retainer or attract
one of the few pro bono legal service organizations to their
cause. .

.

. To deny all consideration of the added burden

and additional risks an attorney under a contingent fee
agreement may have to bear does not strike us as
"reasonable." 110
The First Circuit's opinion in Wildman rejects the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in McKinnon v. City of Berwyn111
and the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Laffey v.
Northwest Airlines.11 2 The position of the minority circuits is
that any upward adjustment for contingency compensates attorneys for bringing unsuccessful civil rights suits. According
to the court in McKinnon, if the logic of a risk adjustment is
carried to conclusion then a lawyer with a one out of fifty
chance of winning would get a multiplier of fifty to compensate for the forty-nine similar cases the lawyer lost." 3 As the
First Circuit points out in Wildman, however, multipliers of
two are unusual.'14
VI.

MODERATON IN MULTIPLIERS

Despite the weakness in the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuit's fears of a multiplier of fifty, the irritation indicated by Judge Wilkey in Laffey has some justification. The
district court had granted a multiplier of 3.5 to enhance a
lodestar of $1,471,241.25. A much more conservative multiplier would have made the fee reasonably compensatory. The
court's revulsion is understandable. Moreover, the court's position that settlements of attorney's fee application are much
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 612-13.
750 F.2d 1383, 1392 (7th Cir. 1984).
746 F.2d 4, 28-29 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3488 (1985).
750 F.2d at 1392.
771 F.2d at 613.
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more likely where the amount of a court-ordered award can
be predicted with some certainty is reasonable. 15
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits take a moderate and more
reasonable position on the issue of upward adjustment. In Sierra Club v. Clark,1 16 the Eighth Circuit approved a multiplier
of thirty percent for contingency, among other factors, and in
LaDuke v. Nelson,1 7 the Ninth Circuit approved a multiplier
of twenty percent. Multipliers roughly in this range would
serve the purpose of providing a reasonably predictable standard and would ensure reasonably compensatory fees in contingent fee cases.
VII.

CONCLUSION

If the expressed goal of Congress to attract lawyers to handle civil rights claims is ever to be met, the formulation of
attorney's fee awards must be structured so as to attract sole
practitioners and lawyers from small general practice firms.
The structure should contemplate a method of setting fee
awards that is reasonably predictable. The courts can move
toward such a structure by adopting the any-significant-issue
test, by giving nonreduced fees in nominal damage cases, by
standardizing hourly rates, and by providing modest upward
adjustments in cases taken on a contingent fee basis.
Bringing a lawsuit to vindicate civil rights involves economic risk. Well-established law firms, whether large or
small, are not likely to undertake such cases. The effectuation
of the congressional goal depends upon a fee award structure
which will attract risk takers.

115. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
116. 755 F.2d 608, 620 (8th Cir. 1985).
117. 762 F.2d 1318, 1333 (9th Cir. 1985).

